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SMOKE AND MIRRORS:
MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.7 AND COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE
E. LEA JOHNSTON†
I. INTRODUCTION

S

entencing finality is falling victim to scarce correctional
resources. With over 1.5 million people currently confined in
state and federal prisons,1 the United States is the world’s
incarceration leader, both in terms of the number of people it
incarcerates and its rates of incarceration.2 Between 1985 and
2010, the state prison population grew by 204%, and states’
correctional spending rose by 674%.3 States now spend about fifty
billion dollars a year housing prisoners,4 a figure second only to

† Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I wish to
thank Ronald Wright, Dylan Greenwood, and the Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy for
inviting me to participate in the Finality in Sentencing Symposium, and symposium
participants for their feedback on the ideas presented at that event. I appreciate William
Berry, Elta Johnston, Lyrissa Lidsky, and Elizabeth Rapaport for reviewing and suggesting
improvements to this article. I am grateful for the summer grant provided by the Levin
College of Law. Finally, I thank Stephen Carr, Rebecca Eikleberry, Chelsea Koester, Eric
Pacifici, Daniel Tullidge, and Christopher Vallandingham for their outstanding research
assistance.
1. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2011, at 3 tbl.2 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
2. MARSHALL CLEMENT ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., THE
NATIONAL SUMMIT ON JUSTICE REINVESTMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY 2 (2011), available at
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSG_JusticeReinvestmentSummitReport.pdf.
3. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CONTINUING FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: SETTING
A NEW COURSE 4 (2010), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/d
ownloads/The-continuing-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections-10-2010-updated.pdf. However, state
correctional populations have recently begun to drop. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA
GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012–ADVANCE COUNTS, at 1
(July 2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12ac.pdf (“The U.S.
prison population declined for the third consecutive year.”).
4. Carrie Johnson, Budget Crunch Forces A New Approach To Prisons, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Feb. 15, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133760412/budget-c
runch-forces-a-new-approach-to-prisons.
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Medicaid spending.5 Over the past few years, a broad consensus
has formed around the need to reduce prison populations,6 with
even prominent “tough on crime” conservatives calling for
criminal justice reform.7 In response, states have instituted various
measures to reduce prison populations and correctional spending,
including increased use and diversity of early-release mechanisms.8
Specifically, recent reports show that states have expanded their
use of good-time credits, enlarged parole eligibility, and
increasingly authorized the “compassionate release” of costly and
low-risk ill or elderly inmates.9

5. Adam Skolnick, Runaway Prison Costs Thrash State Budgets, FISCAL TIMES, Feb. 9,
2011, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/02/09/Runaway-Prison-Costs-Thrash
-State-Budgets.aspx#page.
6. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Alternatives To Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging
Behind?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1273, 1276–84 (2012) (discussing the consensus between
liberals and conservatives on reducing excessive incarceration); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,
PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AMERICA 1 (2012), available
at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/PEW_NationalSurveyRese
archPaper_FINAL.pdf (reporting that voters “overwhelmingly” support shifting nonviolent offenders from prison to effective, less expensive alternatives and that “[s]upport
for sentencing and corrections reforms (including reduced prison terms) is strong across
political parties, regions, age, gender, and racial/ethnic groups”).
7. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States to Save
Money and Lives, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/cont
ent/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604386.html (announcing the Right on Crime
Campaign and calling on conservative legislators to “lead the way” in “intelligently”
reducing prison populations); Neil King, Jr., As Prisons Squeeze Budgets, GOP Rethinks Crime
Focus, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2013, http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873
23836504578551902602217018.html (detailing efforts of conservative governors to enact
criminal justice reform and quoting Eli Lerher as describing the movement as “the most
important social reform effort on the right since the rise of the pro-life movement in the
1970s”).
8. See NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING
2012: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1–2 (2013) (stating that “[s]tate lawmakers
in at least 24 states adopted 41 criminal justice policies that in 2012 may contribute to
downscaling prison populations . . . while promoting effective approaches to public
safety” and providing an overview of recent policy reforms, including sentence
modification and parole reforms); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS
POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING
COMMUNITIES 9–14 (2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispo
ssible.pdf (identifying and endorsing a number of sentencing and corrections reforms
enacted recently by Texas, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio,
including “back-end” sentencing reforms).
9. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial
Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465,
485–98 (2010) (examining the recent proliferation of early release legislation, including
the expansion of parole eligibility, sentence credit, and compassionate release programs)
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Within this shifting climate, the American Law Institute has
revised the sentencing articles of the Model Penal Code to include
three important sentence modification measures.10 One of these
provisions, Model Penal Code § 305.7, would allow a judge to
reduce a prison sentence at any time for any “compelling” reason,
if the purposes of sentencing justify sentence modification.11
Compelling circumstances may include advanced age, physical
infirmity, or any other circumstance that sufficiently affects the
retributive or utilitarian aims that animate limiting retributivism,12
the philosophy undergirding the revised Model Penal Code
sentencing articles.13 Limiting retributivism provides that
[hereinafter Klingele, Changing the Sentence]; Cara Buckley, Law Has Little Effect on Early
Release for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01/30/nyregion/30parole.html?_r=0 (noting that about a dozen states “expanded,
enacted, or streamlined” compassionate release programs between 2008 and 2010); NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, A REPORT OF THE NCSL SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS WORK GROUP 4–5 (2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/justice/pri
nciples-of-sentencing-and-corrections-policy.aspx (detailing the existence of state sentence
credit laws and conditional release reforms); Michael O’Hear, The Early-Release
Renaissance: Updated Chart, LIFE SENTENCES BLOG (Feb. 25, 2011, 7:26 PM), http://www.lif
esentencesblog.com/?p=1687#more-1687 (documenting and describing early release
measures in thirty-six states). The plight and cost of elderly prisoners, in particular, has
received much recent attention, spurring many jurisdictions to create early release
mechanisms for a subset of these prisoners. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AT
AMERICA’S EXPENSE: THE MASS INCARCERATION OF THE ELDERLY (2012), available at http:/
/www.aclu.org/files/assets/elderlyprisonreport_20120613_1.pdf; TINA CHIU, VERA INST.
OF JUSTICE, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS, INCREASING COSTS, AND GERIATRIC
RELEASE (2010), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/download
s/Its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatric-release.pdf.
10. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 305.1, 305.6, 305.7 (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2011) [hereinafter TD-2] (approved at the May 17, 2011 Annual Meeting, subject to
discussion at the Meeting and editorial prerogative), available at http://www.ali.org/0002
1333/Model%20Penal%20Code%20TD%20No%202%20%20online%20version.pdf.
Section 305.1 provides for presumptive sentence reductions of 15% for good conduct, and
an additional 15% for participation in rehabilitative programs. See id. § 305.1. Section
305.6 would authorize judicial sentence modification for prisoners who have served
fifteen years of any sentence of imprisonment when the purposes of sentencing would be
better served by a modified sentence than by the completion of the original sentence. See
id. § 305.6. For commentary regarding the three proposed sentence modification
measures, see Richard S. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code
Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 195–200 (2009). For an outline of the American Law
Institute’s process for revising the Model Penal Code, see Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic
Impact Statements, O’Connor’s Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a
Sentencing Reform Agenda, 61 FLA. L. REV. 683, 687–89 (2009).
11. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(1), (7).
12. Id.; see also id. cmt. a (scope) & cmt. b (criteria for eligibility).
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter TD-1], available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/mpc_2007.pdf.
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individual sentences should occur within the bounds of deserved
punishment, while allowing for the accommodation of a number
of crime-control goals (such as rehabilitation, deterrence, and
incapacitation), as well as restorative and reintegrative objectives.14
Section 305.7 of the revised Model Penal Code contains
much to celebrate. Its tethering to limiting retributivism grounds
sentence modification in the purposes of sentencing. The
provision does not restrict sentence modification to certain
groups, but rather recognizes that countless changes in the
offender, his family, his community, and society might merit
sentence reconsideration.15 It evidences humility in the sentencing
process and the recognition that finality is less precious than the
humaneness and ultimate justness of punishment.
As scholars have recognized, the success of an early-release
measure such as Section 305.7 depends upon the clarity and
persuasive force of its underlying theoretical rationale.16 Section
305.7 makes clear that judges should evaluate the merits of a
prisoner’s grounds for sentence modification in light of the
principles of limiting retributivism,17 and the comments to Section
305.7 provide a few examples of how certain offender
circumstances may affect the retributive or utilitarian aims of
punishment.18 However, the historical framing of Section 305.7—
its express derivation from existing and previous state and federal
laws—also affects its theoretical lucidity and force.19
The American Law Institute presented Section 305.7 as
derivative of states’ and the federal government’s compassionate
release statutes.20 In many respects, this choice of precursor
appears obvious and sensible: compassionate release provisions,

14. See id. § 1.02(2)(a); see also infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law,
90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 633 (2012) (“The key to a sustainable and healthy transformation of
penal law and policy is reform guided by longer-range principles.”); Margaret Colgate
Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About “Second Look” and Other Sentence Reduction
Provisions of The Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859, 866 (2011)
(“Without a proper theoretical underpinning, sentence modification laws are less likely to
be perceived as legitimate and may be less durable than laws that have been more robustly
conceptualized.”).
17. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7); see also id. cmts. b & h.
18. See id. § 305.7 cmt. b.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See infra Part II.C.
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like Section 305.7, authorize early release when compelling
circumstances—such as serious, debilitating illness—suggest that
continued imprisonment would be unwise or inappropriate.21
However, important substantive, procedural, and theoretical
differences distinguish Section 305.7 from traditional
compassionate release laws.22 These differences, which arguably
outweigh similarities between the measures, hold potential
ramifications for the perceived legitimacy of Section 305.7 and
states’ willingness to adopt the provision in its current form.
Indeed, the unintended result of locating Section 305.7 within the
tradition of compassionate release may be to dilute the clarity and
force of its theoretical principles and to obstruct the measure’s
application to populations that would not typically qualify for
relief under traditional compassionate release statutes.23 In
essence, by presenting Section 305.7 as a compassionate release
measure, legislatures and the public will tend to view the provision
much more narrowly than they otherwise would, leading to a
distortion in its underlying theory, a narrowing in scope, and
probable underuse.24
The modest aims of this article are to explore the aptness
and possible implications of framing Section 305.7 as a
compassionate release measure and to propose an alternative
framing device for consideration. Although components of
Section 305.7 correspond to traditional compassionate release
statutes, its broad scope and allocation of decision-making
authority more closely resemble states’ judicial sentence
modification provisions.25 These provisions often afford judges a
window of time in which to reconsider a sentence for any reason
and may be used to advance the interests of justice or a range of
utilitarian sentencing objectives.26 The analogy of judicial sentence
modification is far from perfect—nearly all states limit judges’
revision power to one year or less,27 for instance—but this
alternative framing may facilitate the expression of the principles
21. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7).
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.D.
24. See infra Part III.D.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See Steven Grossman & Stephen Shapiro, Judicial Modification of Sentences in
Maryland, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003).
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of limiting retributivism and further the perceived legitimacy and
ultimate resilience of Section 305.7.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part II outlines the
substance of revised Model Penal Code § 305.7 and its derivation,
and implicit designation, as a compassionate release measure. Part
III highlights ways in which Section 305.7 differs from traditional
compassionate release laws and untangles the rationales that
support these measures. This part also posits possible reasons why
the American Law Institute might have chosen to utilize a
compassionate release label and explores two potential,
unintended consequences of this choice. Part IV suggests that
judicial sentence modification may provide an alternative framing
device for Section 305.7 and explores some benefits that could
flow from this framing. Finally, Part V delineates several areas of
theoretical inquiry that could expand the conception of
“compassionate release” and contribute to the lucidity and
strength of Section 305.7’s theoretical foundation.
II. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.7
Proposed Model Penal Code § 305.7 authorizes judicial
modification of any sentence of imprisonment, at any time, for any
“compelling reason warranting modification of sentence.”28 A
reason need not be “extraordinary” in order to warrant relief.29
Section 305.7 includes a partial list of potentially compelling
circumstances,30 including advanced age,31 physical or mental
infirmity,32 and exigent family circumstances,33 but a judge’s
authority to modify a prisoner’s sentence is not limited to these

28. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(1).
29. See Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 871–72 n.73 (noting that the criterion of
“extraordinary” was eliminated in 2010 in recognition of the fact that “some
circumstances that might warrant release (such as old age and serious illness) [are] hardly
‘extraordinary’”); see also TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (comparing the “compelling
reasons” standard to the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” criterion in federal law
and “good cause shown” and general suitability criteria in two states).
30. None of these offender circumstances necessarily suffices to justify sentence
modification. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (quoting § 305.7(7) and emphasizing
that “such considerations [must] ‘justify a modified sentence in light of the purposes of
sentencing in § 1.02(2)’”).
31. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 305.7(1), (7); see also id. cmt. a (scope) & cmt. b (criteria for eligibility).
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grounds.34 A “compelling” reason is one that, at least,35 suggests
that resentencing would better serve the purposes of sentencing,
outlined in Section 1.02(2),36 than would the full execution of an
original sentence.37 This Part explores the relationship of Section
305.7 to the theory of limiting retributivism expressed in Section
1.02(2), the diversity of possible grounds for relief under Section
305.7, and the derivation and designation of the provision as a
compassionate release measure.
A. Limiting Retributivism
Section 305.7 authorizes a judge to modify a prisoner’s
sentence when an enumerated circumstance or another
compelling reason, evaluated in light of the numerous purposes of
sentencing outlined in Section 1.02(2), justifies the modification.38
Section 1.02(2) embodies the theory of limiting retributivism,
where the sentences of individual offenders must occur “within a
range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of
offenders.”39 Proportionality thus provides the boundaries, or high
and perhaps low ends, of appropriate sentences. Within that
34. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 165 (discussing ambiguity in the meaning of the term
“compelling”).
36. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7).
37. Cf. id. § 305.6(4) (“Sentence modification under this provision should be viewed
as analogous to a resentencing in light of present circumstances. The inquiry shall be
whether the purposes of sentencing in § 1.02(2) would better be served by a modified
sentence than the prisoner’s completion of the original sentence.”).
38. Id. § 305.1(1), (7).
39. TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(i). Professor Norval Morris was the progenitor
of the theory of limiting retributivism, and his theoretical writings inspired the sentencing
philosophy expressed in Section 1.02(2). See id. § 1.02(2) cmt. b(3). Morris’s most
important writings on the theory of limiting retributivism include, NORVAL MORRIS &
MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A
RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990), NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1982), and NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974). For a detailed
analysis of Morris’s work, see Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism: The Consensus Model
of Criminal Punishment, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Michael
Tonry ed., 2004) and Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME
AND JUST. 363 (1997). This Article accepts, without evaluation or critique, the American
Law Institute’s determination that limiting retributivism is the best approach to
sentencing in order to provide a stable context in which to evaluate the effects of the
framing of Section 305.7. Others’ reception of limiting retributivism has not been as
impassive. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17
(2003); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2003).
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range, a sentencing judge may, “when reasonably feasible,” set an
offender’s sentence based on utilitarian considerations relating to
crime control (rehabilitation, incapacitation, and general
deterrence), restorative, or reintegrative aims.40 Section 1.02(2)
adopts the principle of parsimony, whereby a sentence should be
“no more severe than necessary” to achieve utilitarian purposes
within the bounds of an offender’s moral desert.41 Thus, sentence
modification may be appropriate when a change in offender
circumstances renders the execution of an original sentence
unnecessary to achieve incapacitation or general deterrence, or
where the terms of the original sentence are now ill-suited to
achieve rehabilitation.42 In these cases, a permissible modification
could reduce the existing sentence but must keep the offender’s
overall punishment within the confines of proportionate
punishment.43 A disproportionately severe or inhumane sentence
would also justify relief.44 The few commentators who have
remarked upon the theoretical rationale of Section 305.7 have
characterized the measure as allowing a court to correct an unjust,
excessive, unwise, inappropriate, or inhumane sentence.45
40. TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(ii).
41. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(iii) & cmt. f. On the value and use of parsimony, see NORVAL
MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 60–62 (1974); see also Richard S. Frase, The
Theories of Proportionality and Desert, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS 131, 141 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (discussing the
principle of parsimony as an example of alternative-means, utilitarian proportionality).
42. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (“The purposes of sentencing that
originally supported a sentence of imprisonment may in some instances become
inapplicable to a prisoner . . . whose physical or mental condition renders it unnecessary,
counterproductive, or inhumane to continue a term of confinement.”).
43. Id.
44. See id.; see also infra Part V (listing retributive concerns and utilitarian principles
of proportionality that could justify sentence modification under Section 305.7). Even
though deontological concerns of justice inspire the conception of proportionate
punishment within Section 1.02(2), the provision avoids the use of the term “retribution”
or “retributivism” in employing proportionality constraints. See TD-1, supra note 13, §
1.02(2) cmt. b & rep. n.b(3). For a discussion of the various retributive and utilitarian
principles at work in Morris’s limiting retributivism, see Frase, supra note 39, at 133–41,
143.
45. See Frase, supra note 10, at 196–98 (observing that Section 305.7 assumes that
“some offenders merit sentence reduction, in light of governing sentencing purposes,
based on facts that could not be known at the time of the original sentencing” and
exploring circumstances that may justify sentence modification); Cecelia Klingle, The Early
Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 454–55 (2012) (endorsing Section 305.7 for
permitting the correction of injustices that come to light after the commencement of a
sentence); Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 861, 869, 871 (suggesting that early release
would be appropriate if changed circumstances rendered a sentence “unwise or unjust”
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B. Types of “Compelling” Circumstances
A wide variety of circumstances could justify early release
under Section 305.7. Earlier drafts of the revised Model Penal
Code’s sentencing articles limited relief under Section 305.7 to
much narrower grounds,46 but Section 305.7 now extends as
broadly as the “second look” provision of Section 305.6.47 Indeed,
the substantive inquiry of Section 305.7 and 305.6 appears to be
identical.48 While Section 305.7 permits a judge to modify a
sentence if she finds any “compelling reason [that] justif[ies] a
modified sentence in light of the purposes of sentencing in §
1.02(2),”49 Section 305.6 allows a judicial decision-maker to adjust
the sentences of certain prisoners “in light of present
circumstances” when “the purposes of sentencing in § 1.02(2)
would better be served by a modified sentence than the prisoner’s
completion of the original sentence.”50 Any difference in
substance between the two provisions would derive from the term
“compelling” in Section 305.7, but it is unclear what work this
term might do in restricting the reach of sentence modification
under the measure.51
Many types of “compelling” circumstances exist that may
implicate the purposes of sentencing included in Section 1.02(2)
and therefore may provide a basis for sentence modification.
Professor Richard Frase has catalogued and evaluated a number of
types of changed circumstances that could merit—or even
require—sentence reduction under Section 305.7.52 These
and identifying, in passing, “mercy” and “compassion” as animating forces of the
sentence modification provisions).
46. See infra note 93 (tracing revisions of Section 305.7).
47. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.6 (authorizing the filing of a petition once every
ten years, after an inmate has served at least fifteen years in prison, for sentence reduction
“in light of present circumstances”).
48. Compare id. § 305.6, with id. § 305.7.
49. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7). It is worth noting that, while the comments
indicate that the drafters intend Section 305.7 to respond to circumstances that “arise or
are discovered after the time of sentencing,” no such limiting language appears within the
text of Section 305.7. Id. § 305.7 cmt. a; see also id. cmt. h (“Section 305.7 is designed to
respond to circumstances that arise or are discovered after the time of sentencing,
including cases in which the full effects of known conditions, such as a prisoner’s physical
or mental illness, are not appreciated until a later date.”).
50. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.6.
51. See infra note 165. Section 305.6 only applies to inmates who have served at least
fifteen years of any term of imprisonment. See supra note 47.
52. Frase, supra note 10, at 196–98.
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grounds include advanced age or infirmity; substantial progress
toward rehabilitation; failure to satisfactorily participate in
treatment; religious conversion or other transformation of
character; new technologies for treatment and for assessing risk
and rehabilitation; meritorious postsentencing behavior (such as
preventing a riot or saving the life of another); changes in family,
victim, or community circumstances (such as the death of the only
fitting caregiver for the offender’s minor children or successful
victim-offender mediation); and change in societal view of the
inmate’s crime.53 Professor Frase derived many of these
circumstances from the then-existing version of Section 305.6, but
noted that all rationales for sentence modification “would apply
under the proposed catchall ‘extraordinary and compelling
circumstances’ expected to be added to Section 305.7.”54 The
drafters added this catchall to Section 305.7 as predicted and then
expanded it by eliminating the requirement of “extraordinary” in
2010.55
C. Framing Section 305.7 as a Compassionate Release
Measure
The American Law Institute locates Section 305.7 squarely
within the history of jurisdictions’ compassionate release efforts.56
Comment a states:
Most state codes include sentencemodification
provisions
that
permit
the
“compassionate release” or “medical parole” or
“geriatric release” of aged or infirm prisoners,
although the relevant terminology and eligibility
criteria vary widely. A handful of jurisdictions have
enacted provisions that include broader or openended standards. Current federal law on the subject
states that “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
may warrant the reduction of an incarceration
term. . . . Section 305.7 embraces and combines all
of the above grounds for sentence modification into
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 197.
See supra note 29; infra note 93.
See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. a.
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a single provision, to be administered by trial courts
in light of the underlying purposes of sentencing in
§ 1.02(2).57
Other comments explore and defend the differences between
Section 305.7 and states’ compassionate release laws.58
The framing of Section 305.7 as a compassionate release
measure is absolute and powerful. The derivation of Section 305.7
from the federal government’s and states’ compassionate release
laws grounds Section 305.7 within a rich history of jurisdictions’
responses to seriously ill, disabled, and elderly prisoners.59 Because
the commentary does not temper this derivation with a significant
discussion of other early-release or sentence-modification
measures,60 the derivation also functions to designate or effectively
label Section 305.7 as a compassionate release measure.61 This
label holds implications for the popular understanding of the
provision as well as its narrative, theoretical clarity, and ultimate
acceptance.62 In essence, the framing provides a lens through
which to view and understand the purposes and ultimate effect of
Section 305.7. While framing Section 305.7 as a compassionate
release measure conveys familiarity and popular legitimacy to the
provision,63 the many differences between Section 305.7 and
traditional compassionate release laws suggest that the label may
carry unintended consequences for its adoption and
implementation.64

57. Id.
58. See id. cmt. b (criteria for eligibility); id. cmt. c (identity of decisionmaker); id.
cmt. i (permitted modifications).
59. See, e.g., Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison
Population and the Search for a Cost-Effective and Socially Acceptable Means of Addressing It, 15
ELDER L.J. 473 (2007); Gregory J. O’Meara, Compassion and the Public Interest: Wisconsin’s
New Compassionate Release Legislation, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 33, 33 (2010) (noting that by
1994, “only three jurisdictions . . . had no programs for the parole or release of terminally
ill prisoners”); cf. William B. Aldenberg, Bursting at the Seams: An Analysis of CompassionateRelease Statutes and the Current Problem of HIV and AIDS in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 34 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 541 (1998) (discussing the history of
compassionate release programs with a focus on the AIDS epidemic).
60. Cf. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (noting that good-time provisions provide
sentence discounts for prisoners’ extraordinarily meritorious conduct).
61. See id. at cmt. a.
62. See infra Part III.D.
63. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
64. See infra Part III.A.
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III. LABEL OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE: MUDDYING AND
MISLEADING
Both compassionate release statutes and Section 305.7
authorize early release for inmates with serious medical or agerelated conditions.65 However, Section 305.7 spans much more
broadly than traditional compassionate release laws and arguably
better resembles other sentence-modification measures available
under state law.66 It is therefore worth examining the aptness of
the compassionate release analogy for Section 305.7, why this
precursor was chosen, and the consequences that this designation
may hold for the adoption and implementation of the provision.
A. The Ill Fit of a Compassionate Release Label
Despite its label as a compassionate release provision,
Section 305.7 differs significantly from most compassionate release
measures in existence today. First, nearly all existing
compassionate release statutes restrict release to terminally or
seriously ill, incapacitated prisoners.67 As Dr. Brie Williams and
her colleagues have concluded, to meet the guidelines for release
in most states, prisoners “must have a predictable terminal
prognosis, be expected to die quickly, or have a health or
functional status that considerably undermines” the justifications
for incarceration by demonstrating that they no longer pose a risk
to public safety or would not benefit from rehabilitation inside a
correctional facility.68 Indeed, while the details of states’
compassionate release statutes differ, their broad parameters are

65. See, e.g., TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(1), (7); id. cmt. a (scope); id. cmt. b
(criteria for eligibility); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-131k(a)(1) (2012).
66. See infra Part IV.
67. Brie A. Williams et al., Balancing Punishment and Compassion for Seriously Ill
Prisoners, 155 ANN. INTERN. MED. 122, 122 (2011). (“Whereas medical eligibility
guidelines vary by jurisdiction, most [compassionate release statutes] require the
following: a terminal or severely debilitating medical condition [and] a condition that
cannot be appropriately cared for within the prison.”); see also CHIU, supra note 9, at 6–7
(listing eligibility requirements for geriatric release laws and concluding that, “[t]o be
eligible for geriatric release, inmates must meet a number of requirements, usually related
to their age, medical condition, and risk to public safety”).
68. Williams et al., supra note 67, at 123; see also Marjorie P. Russell, Too Little, Too
Late, Too Slow: Compassionate Release of Terminally Ill Prisoners—Is the Cure Worse Than the
Disease?, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 799, 828–29 (1994) (reporting that all states’ compassionate
release processes require medical evaluations and discussing varying medical standards).
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so consistent that the term “compassionate release” has developed
a consistent, generic definition in the scholarly literature that
centers on an early-release measure’s application to terminally ill,
seriously ill, or elderly inmates.69 By contrast, as Professor Frase
has aptly demonstrated, a diverse array of changed
circumstances—including positive changes in the offender;
meritorious postsentencing acts; changes in the offender’s family,
the victim, or the community; and changes in societal perception
of the offender’s crime or sentencing factors—may justify
sentence modification under Model Penal Code § 305.7.70
Second, typical compassionate release statutes manifest an
absolute commitment to protecting public safety.71 As a
substantive matter, the requirement that an individual pose no
threat to society is “ubiquitous” in compassionate release
statutes.72 States often require that an inmate be physically or
mentally unable—not merely unlikely—to commit a crime or pose
a danger to the public.73 In addition, most state statutes include
69. See, e.g., Nicole M. Murphy, Dying to be Free: An Analysis of Wisconsin’s Restructured
Compassionate Release Statute, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1679, 1681 (2012) (“Compassionate release
refers to early release programs for inmates with serious medical conditions, typically
labeled as terminally ill, as well as elderly inmates who may be eligible for release due
exclusively to advanced age.”); Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early
Assessments and State-Level Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1568–69 (2012) (“The term
‘compassionate release’ . . . has become a nationally recognized generic term for statutes
allowing earned release for age or health reasons.”); Williams et al., supra note 67, at 122
(“Compassionate release is a mechanism to allow some eligible, seriously ill prisoners to
die outside of prison before sentence completion.”); see also Russell, supra note 68, at 801
n.10 (using the term “compassionate release” to “identify all forms of release available to
terminally ill prisoners” and recognizing that state terminology includes, but is not limited
to “medical parole, medical furlough, executive clemency, medical pardon, medical
reprieve, medical release, parole for humanitarian reasons, parole of dying prisoners,
community furlough, and compassionate leave”); cf. Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at
860 n.7 (classifying “retroactive sentence recalculations where overly harsh sentences are
subsequently reduced” as an example of “so-called ‘compassionate release statutes’” in an
article defending the revised Model Penal Code § 305.7).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54; see also TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(1),
(7); id. cmt. a (scope); id. cmt. b (criteria for eligibility). For a discussion of how the
substantive criteria of section 305.7 compare to those in the federal safety valve provision,
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), see infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
71. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(6)(b); see also Russell, supra note 68, at 829–30
(“With the exception of Delaware, all of the states require a determination that the
prisoner's condition so debilitates or incapacitates him that he is incapable of posing a
danger to society.”).
73. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-131k(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing compassionate
parole release for certain inmates “so physically or mentally debilitated, incapacitated or
infirm as a result of advanced age or as a result of a condition, disease or syndrome that is
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eligibility restrictions that exclude prisoners who have committed
particular crimes or are serving certain sentences from
consideration.74 For instance, a number of states exclude
individuals convicted of capital felonies;75 others exclude
individuals serving life sentences without the possibility of parole.76
Although these criteria could reflect the judgment that the early
release of these prisoners would offend retributive principles of
just deserts,77 they could also evince the determination that these
individuals are particularly dangerous, thus implicating
incapacitation concerns.78 Furthermore, most compassionate
release statutes authorize the revocation of parole if an inmate’s
medical condition improves such that he again poses a danger to

not terminal as to be physically incapable of presenting a danger to society”); FLA. STAT. §
947.149(1) (2012) (authorizing conditional medical release for terminally ill inmates who
have “a condition . . . which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, renders the
inmate terminally ill to the extent that there can be no recovery and death is imminent, so
that the inmate does not constitute a danger to herself or himself or others” and for
“permanently incapacitated inmate[s]” who have “a condition . . . which, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, renders the inmate permanently and irreversibly physically
incapacitated to the extent that the inmate does not constitute a danger to herself or
himself or others”); see also John A. Beck, Compassionate Release From New York State Prisons:
Why are So Few Getting Out?, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 216, 225–28 (1999) (comparing New
York’s incapacity criteria to those of other states).
74. See CHIU, supra note 9, at 9 (observing that state compassionate release programs
“often exclude individuals convicted of violent offenses or sex offenses and those
sentenced to life imprisonment”); Elizabeth Rapaport, You Can’t Get There from Here:
Elderly Prisoners, Prison Downsizing, and the Insufficiency of Cost Cutting Advocacy, 11--12
(2013), available at http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2254691
(“The majority of compassionate release programs either exclude prisoners who were
convicted of violent crimes or require that the prisoner be incapacitated to the extent that
he or she poses no threat to public safety.”).
75. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-131k(a) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 947.149(2) (2012);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-223(a) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.05(C) (West 2012);
see also Russell, supra note 68, at 827 n.112 (listing states that, as of 1994, excluded
prisoners convicted of capital felonies or serving sentences of death).
76. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.05(C); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8.1-2 (2012);
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.146 (West 2013); see also Russell, supra note 68, at 827 n.113
(listing states that, as of 1994, excluded prisoners serving sentences of life without parole).
77. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 73, at 224–25.
78. For more on the connection between incapacitation, life sentencing, and the
death penalty, see William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By Default: An Empirical
Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605 (1999).
For more on incapacitation, indeterminate sentencing, and public safety, see W. David
Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel Apprendi Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of
Punishment 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893 (2009).
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society.79 By contrast, the American Law Institute opted not to
stress incapacitation at the expense of other aims of sentencing,
but instead declared that “[a] global statement . . . incorporating
all of the purposes in § 1.02(2) . . . is superior to a requirement
that only one among those purposes should be reflected in the
judge’s decision.”80
A third feature that distinguishes Section 305.7 from
traditional compassionate release measures involves the allocation
of decision-making authority. In nearly all states, executive branch
officials control compassionate release decisions.81 Most states’
compassionate release programs take the form of medical parole
or medical furlough, and thus are controlled by parole boards or
prison commissioners.82 In addition, governors or boards of
pardons and parole may grant clemency or commute sentences on
the basis of terminal or severe illness.83 In the federal system and
the few states in which trial courts participate in release decisions,
correctional agencies or parole boards typically serve as
gatekeepers, screening eligible applicants.84 Section 305.7, on the
other hand, provides judges with sole decision-making authority
that is unconstrained by executive branch determinations of
eligibility.85
Finally, few, if any, compassionate release statutes predicate
early release on a finding that sentence modification would be a

79. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislators, Three Years of Conditional Release Laws,
THE BULLETIN: ONLINE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY UPDATES, 5 (June 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/Documents/cj/bulletinJune-2010.pdf.
80. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b.
81. See id. § 305.7 cmt. c & rep. n.c.; Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at
494 (“With rare exception, the early release mechanisms share a common feature: they
are controlled by departments of corrections or parole boards.”).
82. See Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 492–94 (describing the
existence of state medical parole programs); Russell, supra note 68, at 819, 824–27; id. at
836 (“In the majority of compassionate release statutes, the decisionmaking power rests in
the parole board.”); Marty Roney, 36 States Offer Release to Ill or Dying Inmates: Programs
Help Cut Costs of Heath Care, Officials Say, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 2008, at 4A; Nat’l
Conference of State Legislators, supra note 79, at 5 (“As of 2009, at least 39 states had laws
governing medical parole.”).
83. See Russell, supra note 68, at 822–24. For one example of a state vesting clemency
power in the board of probation, parole, and pardons, see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-21-920,
24-21-970 (2012).
84. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. c; Russell, supra note 68, at 820–22.
85. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. c (defending the choice not to interpose a
gatekeeper).
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just or proportionate response to the offender’s crime.86 In
essence, compassionate release laws appear to reflect the
determination that cost and incapacitation considerations trump
retributive concerns of just deserts.87 Alternatively, or perhaps in
tandem, it is possible that legislatures have determined that the
exclusion of serious offenders from eligibility suffices to ensure
that intolerable injustice does not occur.88 This disregard for or
crude approximation of the demands of justice contrasts with the
approach taken in Section 305.7, which requires that all sentences
occur within the bounds of proportionate punishment.89
B. Possible Explanations for the Label
Assuming that the term “compassionate release” has a
generally stable definition in the public vernacular and scholarly
literature90—and that Section 305.7 bears little detailed
resemblance to traditional compassionate release measures—why
might the American Law Institute have chosen to employ this
framing for the nearly unbounded provision of Section 305.7?
Several explanations are possible. First, artifacts of the drafting
process may account for its ultimate framing. Early versions of the
draft provision only recognized age and infirmity as grounds for
release and required a recommendation from correctional
authorities.91 Thus, early versions of Section 305.7 closely
resembled traditional compassionate release measures.92 Perhaps
these original conceptions anchored the provision to the concept

86. A possible exception is the federal safety valve statute, which specifies that judges
must consider the factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in release decisions. See 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
87. See infra notes 109–117 (identifying and discussing cost savings as a primary
motivation behind compassionate release laws); infra note 130 (listing sources suggesting
that cost concerns should be considered along with philosophical objectives). For
discussion on whether, and how, cost should factor into sentencing, see infra notes 204–
06, 214 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
89. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(1), (7); TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(i).
90. See supra note 69; infra notes 103, 106.
91. See Frase, supra note 10, at 196 (describing the then-current version of Section
305.7 and anticipated revisions); Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 871–72 n.73.
92. See supra Part III.A.
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of compassionate release, a characterization that persisted even
after revisions dramatically expanded its scope.93
A second, but related, explanation lies in the provision’s
derivation from the federal “safety valve” provision, 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i).94 In contrast to most states’ narrowly drawn
compassionate release criteria, the federal provision permits a
court to modify a term of imprisonment when it finds, upon
motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons and after
considering factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction in
sentence.95 This provision has never enjoyed broad application,
however. The Bureau of Prisons, in its gatekeeping role, has
narrowly limited compassionate release under this provision to
terminally ill inmates with a life expectancy of less than a year, and
to severely, permanently debilitated or impaired prisoners who
pose no threat to public safety.96 Even after the U.S. Sentencing
Commission recommended broader application of the statute in

93. See Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 871–72 n.73 (tracing revisions to Section
305.7 and recounting that a catchall reference to “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
was added in 2009, the reference to family circumstances was added in Tentative Draft
No. 2, and the words “extraordinary and” were omitted in 2010, in recognition of the fact
that advanced age and serious illness were not extraordinary).
94. See Frase, supra note 10, at 196 (describing how the “extraordinary and
compelling” modification standard, added in a revision to Section 305.7, mimics language
in the federal “second look” provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012)); Klingele,
Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 512–13 (noting that Section 305.7, at that time,
“closely track[ed] the federal statute by authorizing sentence reduction at any time based
on age, infirmity, or extraordinary and compelling circumstances, upon recommendation
of a gatekeeping correctional authority”); Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 871 (noting
that Section 305.7 was “[m]odeled on the federal law authorizing sentence reduction for
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons,’ but with one important procedural difference”);
see also TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (referencing the federal provision as a model
for the “compelling reasons” catchall).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). For a thorough discussion of the federal
statute and its application, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY
MINIMUMS, THE ANSWER IS NO: TOO LITTLE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN US FEDERAL
PRISONS (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1112
ForUploadSm.pdf.
96. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra
note 95, at 19–23, 54–59 (detailing the Bureau of Prisons’ position—expressed through
internal memoranda, regulations, and proposed rules—that compassionate release should
be limited to terminal and extremely debilitating medical cases that do not threaten
public safety); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PROGRAM 12–21, 60–62 (Apr. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/or
g/reports/2013/e1306.pdf (summarizing medical and non-medical BOP guidance for
compassionate release consideration).
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2007,97 the Bureau has continued to hew to its restrictive medical
criteria.98 As a result, over the last twenty years, only around two
dozen federal prisoners have received grants of compassionate
release annually, all on medical grounds.99 Thus, although the
federal compassionate release statute contains broad criteria that
literally could apply to any individual with an “extraordinary and
compelling reason” warranting a sentence reduction, its
constricted application has thus far resembled that of most states’
compassionate release measures.100
Finally, the compassionate release label may reflect
strategic considerations. Most critically, the designation serves as
an effective means to legitimize the provision.101 The vast majority
of jurisdictions in the United States have adopted compassionate
release measures.102 Broad support exists for these statutes, and

97. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1B1.13 application n.1 (2012),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_1.p
df (providing that extraordinary and compelling reasons may exist when: “[t]he
defendant is suffering from a terminal illness[;] [t]he defendant is suffering from a
permanent physical or medical condition, or is experiencing deteriorating physical or
mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the
defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and for
which conventional treatment promises no substantial improvement[;] the death or
incapacitation of the defendant’s only family member capable of caring for the
defendant’s minor child or minor children[;]” or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
determines that some other “extraordinary and compelling” reason exists).
98. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra
note 95, at 27; cf. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 96, at 26 (reporting on the
Bureau of Prisons’ attempt to revise its compassionate release regulations and its drafting
of a new guidance memorandum for medical institutions “that will expand the
compassionate release program by making inmates with a life expectancy of up to 18
months eligible for consideration”); Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug
Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-de
pt-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-drug-sentences.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting Attorney
General Eric Holder’s release of a new Department of Justice policy to “expand a
program of ‘compassionate release’ for ‘elderly inmates who did not commit violent
crimes and have served significant portions of their sentences’”).
99. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note
95, at 34, 49; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 96, at 34–35.
100. William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-examination of the
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 866 (2009) (“[T]here is no
requirement in the Bureau of Prisons' procedures that its broad discretionary authority be
exercised so narrowly.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY
MINIMUMS, supra note 95, at 3. Recent federal policy changes suggest that this practice
may change. See supra note 98.
101. See Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 861–62.
102. See Murphy, supra note 69, at 1695 (reporting that forty-one jurisdictions allow
“some sort of medical release,” thirty-nine states provide for medical parole by statute,
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liberal and conservative pundits alike have recently called for their
increased usage.103 Thus, labeling Section 305.7 as a
compassionate release measure effectively demystifies the
provision and naturalizes its adoption.104 In addition, this framing
dictates the course of the provision’s narrative by linking Section
305.7 with the populations most closely associated with states’
compassionate release efforts—the terminally ill, the elderly, and
the severely physically incapacitated.105 These populations include
the most appealing candidates for early release because of their
perceived low risk of recidivism and high cost of care.106 Moreover,
the close association of compassionate release with elderly and
terminally ill prisoners may help the public overlook the omission
from Section 305.7 of criteria generally found in states’ statutes
such as non-dangerousness.107
and thirty-six states have statutes for early release on grounds of health or age); Laura
Tobler & Kristine Goodwin, Nat’l Conference of State Legislators, Reducing Correctional
Health Care Spending, LEGISBRIEF (Mar. 2013), http://www.afscmeinfocenter.org/privatiza
tionupdate/2013/03/reducing-correctional-health-care-spending.htm (“[A]t least 41
states allow medically incapacitated or terminally ill inmates to leave prison early if they
do not pose a public safety risk.”); Williams et al., supra note 67, at 122 (“Compassionate
release is a matter of federal statute under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and now
all but 5 states have some mechanism through which dying prisoners can seek release.”).
103. See The Editorial Board, In Place of Compassion, Cruelty, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2013,
at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/opinion/in-place-of-compassio
n-cruelty.html; Tina Maschi, The State of Aging: Prisoners and Compassionate Release Programs,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tina-masch
i/the-state-of-aging-prisoners_b_1825811.html; Nation’s Oldest Prisoners May Benefit From
New Outlook Toward Compassionate-Release Program, FOXNEWS.COM (May 12, 2013), http://
www.foxnews.com/us/2013/05/12/nation-oldest-prisoners-may-benefit-from-new-outlook
-toward-compassionate.
104. See Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 868 (characterizing “an authority for early
release in the event of compelling changes in a prisoner’s circumstances, such as serious
illness or disability, advanced age, or family exigency” as a “familiar” sentence reduction
mechanism).
105. See id. at 865.
106. See, e.g., Vitiello, supra note 6, at 1304 (“Around the country, early release for
older prisoners—typically based on evidence-based criteria—is not controversial.”); Jack
Dolan, Despite Medical Parole Law, Hospitalized Prisoners are Costing California Taxpayers
Millions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/02/local/
la-me-prisons-20110302; Maschi, supra note 103; Amy Neff Roth, Compassion vs. Safety:
Should Aging/Ill Prisoners Be Released?, OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Utica, NY) (June 25, 2012,
12:20 AM), http://www.uticaod.com/news/x2102585582/Compassion-v-safety-Should-agi
ng-ill-prisoners-be-released?zc_p=0#axzz2XKYo8t90.
107. Legislatures or the public might view such criteria as more dispensable if Section
305.7 were limited to these populations. But see, e.g., Aldenberg, supra note 59, at 553
(recounting the example of a bedridden inmate with AIDS, who had been convicted of
attempted criminal transmission of HIV, who was rearrested for prostitution after her
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All of this discussion about the characterization of Section
305.7 would be needless quibbling—surely it is compassionate,
after all, to reduce the lawful sentence of any prisoner, for any
sound reason—if the provision’s designation as a compassionate
release measure did not carry potentially negative consequences
for its adoption, implementation, and longevity. Understanding
why the label of compassionate release may portend such
deleterious consequences requires an elucidation of the term’s
theoretical baggage.
C. Rationales for Compassionate Release Measures
Commentators have paid relatively little attention to the
theoretical and practical justifications for compassionate release,108
but the primary motivation behind these measures appears to
avoid (or, rather, to deflect) the cost of caring for elderly and
seriously ill prisoners when their release will not pose a threat to
public safety.109 The cost of housing geriatric and terminally ill

compassionate release). Cf. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 96, at iv (finding a
“recidivism rate of 3.5 percent” for inmates released through the federal compassionate
release program, which has only granted release on narrow, medical grounds).
108. See Reitz, supra note 10, at 706–07 (“No one has yet given adequate time and
energy to the question of when the edifice of determinacy should give way to other
concerns, or how back-end release discretion should best be organized and exercised
when it exists.”). A partial list of theoretical commentary on compassionate release laws
includes Aldenberg, supra note 59, at 548–50, 567, 569–70; Beck, supra note 73, at 223–25
(outlining four main considerations of compassionate release measures, including “a
humanitarian concern for the dying,” “a reassessment of the purpose and justification for
the inmate’s sentence,” a desire to “save correctional funds,” and a “concern that early
release could pose a risk to society”); Berry, supra note 100; Murphy, supra note 69, at
1681–82, 1691–93, 1697–1700; Russell, supra note 68, at 804–06. Other scholars have
discussed mitigation of punishment on grounds of age or illness within a broader
discussion of mercy. See, e.g., LINDA ROSS MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY 110–11 (2010);
KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 11, 97–98,
173–75 (1989); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1465–71 (2004)
[hereinafter Markel, Against Mercy].
109. See, e.g., CHIU, supra note 9, at 2 (“To reduce the costs of caring for aging
inmates—or to avert future costs—legislators and policymakers have been increasingly
willing to consider early release for those older prisoners who are seen as posing a
relatively low risk to public safety.”); Fan, supra note 16, at 623 (“Budgetary pressures are
the common and prevalent justification for the sentence reduction and early release
measures.”); Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 865 (identifying the primary motivation
for states’ early release efforts as “a desire for lower custodial populations and lower
cost”); cf. Margaret Colgate Love, Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate Sentencing
System: Report of the Second Look Roundtable, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 211, 216 (2009), available
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1525/fsr.2009.21.3.211.pdf (expressing state

4 JOHNSTON PROOF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SMOKE AND MIRRORS

4/19/2014 11:38 AM

69

inmates significantly exceeds the cost of housing their younger,
healthier peers,110 because of their needs for medical services and
devices, transportation to specialized medical centers, and
increased correctional staffing.111 A correctional system may spend
two to four times more on a geriatric or seriously ill prisoner than
on a younger, healthy inmate.112 Because prisoners are ineligible
for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement for care received in
prisons,113 releasing inmates otherwise eligible for federal
programs would relieve states of a significant expenditure.114 The
American Civil Liberties Union estimates that releasing an aging
prisoner would save a state, on average, $66,294 annually,115 in
addition to possibly generating increased income through sales
and income tax.116 Proponents of compassionate release laws have
also argued that the release of low-risk, high-cost prisoners would
free up valuable prison space for younger, more dangerous
inmates.117
A second motivation is humanitarian in nature.118 This
consideration, most prominent in the 1990s at the height of the

correctional officials’ view that “it is easier to sell mercy if it increases public safety and
saves money”).
110. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 9, at 26–27 (estimating the annual
incarceration cost per prisoner at $34,135 and the annual incarceration cost per elderly
prisoner at around $68,270); infra note 112.
111. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 9, at 28–29; CHIU, supra note 9, at 5.
112. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 9, at 27; CHIU, supra note 9, at 5;
Daniel Arkin, Exploding Number of Elderly Prisoners Strains System, Taxpayers, U.S. NEWS
(June 29, 2013, 6:57 PM), http://www.usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/29/1919202
0-exploding-number-of-elderly-prisoners-strains-system-taxpayers?lite#about_blog.
113. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 9, at 33 & n.62. However, states may
receive Medicaid reimbursement for the bills of prison inmates who stay in private or
community hospitals for more than twenty-four hours, so long as the inmates are
Medicaid-eligible. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OLD BEHIND BARS: THE AGING PRISON
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 78–79 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/usprisons0112webwcover_0.pdf; Christine Vestal, Medicaid for
Prisoners: States Missing Out on Millions, USA TODAY (June 25, 2013 10:07 AM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/25/stateline-medicaidprisoners/2455201.
114. CHIU, supra note 9, at 5.
115. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 9, at 26-27.
116. Id. at 30. Opponents contend that compassionate release statutes merely shift the
cost of caring for these expensive individuals to other governmental programs and thus
provide no real savings to taxpayers. CHIU, supra note 9, at 8.
117. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 9, at 1; Aldenberg, supra note 59,
at 552; Russell, supra note 68, at 805.
118. See Nadine Curran, Blue Hairs in The Bighouse: The Rise In the Elderly Inmate
Population, Its Effect on the Overcrowding Dilemma and Solutions to Correct It, 26 NEW ENG. J.
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AIDS epidemic,119 typically manifests as a desire to afford dignity
to the dying.120 Observing in 1999 that “[t]he genesis of all
compassionate release programs is a humanitarian concern for the
dying,” Dr. John Beck argued that, “[e]ven with the strong public
revulsion for criminals, most civilians can accept the notion that
all inmates—except the most incorrigible—and their families
should have some meaningful time together before those
prisoners die.”121 In the words of Nadine Curran,
[Compassionate release programs] serve as a
humanitarian solution to a prisoner’s last days. This
is important for the terminally ill, elderly inmate
because it will offer [him or her] some comfort to
know that when the time comes, [he or she] will not
have to die behind bars. . . . [I]mplementing a
medical parole sets an example for society that
death brings a need for dignity and respect that a
civilized population should preserve for all people,
regardless of whether they are in prison.122
While at times this notion has assumed spiritual overtones,123 it
most often is expressed as a dignitarian value worthy of civilized
peoples.124

CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 225, 260–61 (2000) (identifying the two purposes of
medical parole as affording dignity in death and correctional cost savings); Heather
Habes, Paying for the Graying: How California Can More Effectively Manage Its Growing Elderly
Inmate Population, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 395, 417–18 (2011) (“Compassionate release
statutes serve important functions: prisons save on funerary expense, gain inmate space
more quickly, and inmates are allowed to spend their last days with their families at little
or no risk to the public.”); Russell, supra note 68, at 803 (“There appear to be two primary
concerns at issue: death with dignity, independent of extraordinary and dehumanizing
medical intervention; and cost.”).
119. See Beck, supra note 73, at 216, 220–21, 223 (explaining the importance of New
York’s medical parole program in the context of the AIDS epidemic of the 1990s).
120. See id. at 222–23.
121. Id. at 223; see also Aldenberg, supra note 59, at 552 (quoting the mother of Larry
Rembert, who died of AIDS in prison: “For the government to deny a mother the right to
be with her son at the time of his death is the worst crime of all. . . . [My son] did some
bad things in his life. But where is the compassion?”).
122. Curran, supra note 118, at 260–61.
123. Id. at 260 (quoting Lee Gartenberg, one of the drafters of the Massachusetts
medical parole bill, as explaining that the measure would allow terminally ill prisoners to
seek “spiritual reconciliation” at home prior to death).
ON
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Critically, scholars and other commentators have struggled
with how to square the existence and operation of compassionate
release laws with traditional justifications for punishment.125 While
some commentators have maintained that compassionate release
can cohere with purposes of sentencing,126 one particularly
rigorous inquiry of the possible justifications of compassionate
release, conducted by Professor William Berry, concluded that a
state’s purposes for punishment will usually not justify sentence
mitigation for terminally ill or permanently physically impaired
prisoners, or for inmates needed as caregivers for minor
children.127 Others have agreed with Professor Berry that an
inmate’s medical state (or age) will typically be irrelevant to the
124. See, e.g., Nancy Neveloff Dubler, The Collision of Confinement and Care: End-Of-Life
Care In Prisons and Jails, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 149–50, 153–54 (1998) (discussing
compassionate release within the context of advanced directives and improved care for
terminally ill prisoners); Habes, supra note 118, at 417 (observing that many states “have
recognized that inmates deserve to die in peace with their families and thus have created
statutory provisions that allow for ‘compassionate release’”); Russell, supra note 68, at
802–05 (examining the humanitarian impulse around dying that motivated early
compassionate release measures within the context of “the right to refuse or discontinue
treatment, to make choices about the time and manner of one’s death or the death of a
loved one, and the extent to which these issues should be regulated by the government”).
125. See infra notes 126–131 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 113, at 87–95 (explaining how
compassionate release may be consistent with the four purposes of punishment); MOORE,
supra note 108, at 11 (asserting that adjustments to sentences may be appropriate on
retributivist grounds “to relieve the punishment of an offender who has suffered enough,
or one whose particular circumstances would make him suffer more than he deserves; or
to prevent an unwarranted cruel punishment”); Russell, supra note 68, at 833 (“In light of
current societal values addressing death with dignity, considerations of punishment,
deterrence, and rehabilitation should no longer come into play. The seriousness of the
crime is not deprecated if we permit the terminally ill to die outside the hostile confines
of prison.”); Williams et al., supra note 67, at 122 (“[The traditional justifications for
punishment of retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation] may be
substantially undermined for prisoners who are too ill or cognitively impaired to be aware
of punishment, too sick to participate in rehabilitation, or too functionally compromised
to pose a risk to public safety.”).
127. See Berry, supra note 100, at 872–81 (“[I]n most situations, neither retributive
nor utilitarian sentencing rationales can satisfactorily supply an independent theoretical
basis for compassionate release.”). Professor Berry concedes that permanent physical
incapacitation may diminish the applicability of incapacitation as a justification for
punishment, at least for those prisoners inclined to commit violent crimes, but warns that
“this justification acting alone may prove unsatisfying in its application.” See id. at 880. He
also highlights relief of “an unusually disparate impact” of incarceration on an offender as
supplying potential grounds for mitigation, but concludes that this principle “is rarely
applicable,” even in cases of terminal illness or permanent physical impairment, because
“the presence of such a condition will rarely alter the definition of a proportionate
sentence.” Id. at 876.
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purposes underlying his sentence,128 particularly the state’s need
to exact retribution.129 However, a number of commentators have
opined that, in the context of the low risk and high cost of elderly
and seriously ill prisoners, other important state considerations—
such as cost savings and easing prison overcrowding—should
prevail over a loss of retributive or utilitarian goals.130 Yet, as
Professor Elizabeth Rapaport has recognized, “[c]ost reduction
arguments [to support early release ultimately] look politically

128. Id. at 875–76.
129. See CHIU, supra note 9, at 10 (“Early release for older inmates has attracted
attention because it promises cost savings at relatively low risk to public safety. However,
the practice can be at odds with other criminal justice goals, such as retribution or
incapacitation.”); Beck, supra note 73, at 224 (arguing that a “reassessment of the fairness
of the original sentence, in light of the new information about the inmate's health status,”
should include “a reexamination of the criminal justice and sentencing issues involved in
setting any criminal punishment” but observing that “[t]he inmate’s specific medical state
is not relevant” to many of the purposes underlying an inmate’s sentence, such as the
need for retribution); Habes, supra note 118, at 418 (observing that the punishment of
some criminals released on compassionate release “may fall short of appropriate
retribution”); Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 108, at 1465–71 (offering an extended
retributivist critique of extending compassion-based mercy for ill and dying prisoners).
130. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 100, at 885–87 (concluding that the benefit to the state
in choosing to mitigate an offender’s sentence—on grounds of the inmate’s terminal
illness, of the inmate’s permanent physical impairment, or that the inmate’s release is
necessary for care of a minor child—will “almost always” significantly outweigh the
penological benefit sacrificed by the corresponding sentence reduction); Norris, supra
note 69, at 1591 (“The additional incarceration that an incurably sick or disabled
offender would experience if he or she is not released would have some abstract
punishment or retributive value. But this value, even in this case of the most serious
offenders, will often be outweighed by the lack of risk to the public, the potential cost
savings to the public, and the benefits for the dignity and quality of the life of the
offender and his or her family.”); Russell, supra note 68, at 805 (“When a prisoner is
terminally ill, the achievement of penal goals is less critical, the threat to the public is
diminished or eliminated, and compassion becomes more important.”); cf. Fan, supra
note 16, at 623 (quoting Connecticut legislator Mike Lawlor as stating, “People have to be
willing to explain it and get beyond the usual sort of philosophical battles—tough on
crime, soft on crime. This is just sort of a fiscal reality not a philosophical choice.”).
Professor Richard Frase has argued that cost and resource considerations should factor
into the proportionality of an offender’s sentence through the utilitarian ends-benefits
proportionality principle. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under
Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 47 (2008) (“[I]n proportionality
analysis, measures should not cost more than the benefits they are expected to produce
(including public as well as privately borne costs and burdens), or more than equally
effective alternative measures. . . . As a matter of sound public policy, it is . . . unwise, but
probably not fundamentally unfair to the defendant, to impose a sentence which costs
taxpayers more than the expected benefits are worth, or more than an effective
alternative.”). For discussion on whether, and how, cost should factor into sentencing, see
infra notes 204-206, 214 and accompanying text.
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tenable only when cost savings do not challenge demands for
retribution and public safety.”131
D. Implications of the Label for Section 305.7
As the preceding discussion suggests, depicting Section
305.7 as a compassionate release measure carries potential
hazards. In particular, the branding may effectively elevate a
subset of the aims in limiting retributivism while suppressing other
considerations.132 It also may result in restricting the practical
reach of the provision to those circumstances and populations
currently served by states’ compassionate release statutes.133
Moreover, since jurisdictions’ compassionate release laws rarely
result in the early release of prisoners,134 the designation may
doom Section 305.7 to underuse, regardless of the breadth of its
grounds or accepted rationale.
Recall that Section 305.7 authorizes sentence modification
when a compelling reason justifies modification in light of the
purposes of sentencing set forth in Section 1.02(2).135 Section
1.02(2) lists a number of consequentialist objectives that judges
may pursue, if reasonably feasible, when sentencing an offender
within the bounds of proportionate punishment.136 These
objectives—offender
rehabilitation,
general
deterrence,
incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restoration of crime victims
and communities, and reintegration of offenders into the lawabiding community—are of equal status.137 In addition, a sentence
should be “no more severe than necessary” to achieve the
applicable purposes of punishment.138 Compassionate release laws,

131. Rapaport, supra note 74, at 11.
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 99; infra note 200.
135. TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7).
136. TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(ii). In addition, cost and prioritization of
scarce resources are included as considerations in the administration of the sentencing
system under Section 1.02(2)(b)(v). See id. § 1.02(2)(b)(v).
137. See id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii).
138. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(iii). For an illustration of how sentencing should proceed under
a limiting retributivist framework, see Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 80–81 (2005) (“The first step is to determine whether the top and bottom of the
recommended guidelines range need to be adjusted to account for factors which increase
or decrease the seriousness of the conviction offense. Applying the parsimony principle,
the sentencing judge then begins at the low end of the adjusted range and increases
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on the other hand, largely prioritize the crime-control objective of
incapacitation and the ancillary purposes of cost savings and
correctional management,139 and do not direct the consideration
of other sentencing goals.140 Thus, the branding of Section 305.7
as a compassionate release measure carries the predictable effects
of emphasizing the value of incapacitation and of deflecting
attention from other utilitarian purposes and retributive concerns
of proportionality.141 As a result, judges in states with laws similar
to Section 305.7 may find it difficult to modify sentences on the
basis of offender rehabilitation, for instance, since such orders
would contradict the public narrative about the proper use of a
compassionate release law.142 Such difficulty may exist even if a
judge were to find a reformed offender unlikely to recidivate, so
long as the offender is physically or mentally capable of
reoffending.143
Moreover, saddling Section 305.7 with the rubric of
compassionate release deemphasizes the importance of
proportionate punishment to sentence modification within the
revised Model Penal Code. Most compassionate release laws do

sentencing severity until all applicable case-specific utilitarian sentencing purposes have
been satisfied.”).
139. See Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 45–46
(2006) (identifying “administrative concerns for efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and
resource management” as “main ancillary functions” of sentencing policy and arguing
that a sentencing system should take “realistic account of key management interests”).
For a discussion of how systemic concerns might factor into sentencing, see infra notes
204–206, 214 and accompanying text.
140. In addition to the regular requirement that an individual pose no threat to
public safety, see supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text, some states make cost savings
an explicit statutory criterion, see Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 493 &
n.128. Compassionate release laws also reflect humanitarian concern for the dying and
express respect for the dignity and end-of-life and medical decisions of prisoners. See supra
notes 118–124 and accompanying text.
141. Commentators have expressed a variety of concerns about back-end relief efforts.
See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH & KATHLEEN J. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE 108
(1979) (raising the possibility that “second looks” could undermine front-end assessments
and accountability); Frase, supra note 10, at 200 (expressing similar concerns as to Section
305.7); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved
Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1210 (2005) (arguing that “‘backdoor’ parole
releasing authority applicable to large numbers of offenders may promote efficiency . . .
but undermines retributive values, truth in sentencing, the accuracy of resource impact
assessments, and the self-restraint policymakers feel when there is no potential backdoor
‘safety valve’”).
142. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 69 and 73 accompanying text.
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not direct judges to consider the dictates of proportionate
punishment,144 and commentators have identified the potential
conflict between compassionate release measures and retributive
demands.145 However, sentence modification under Section 305.7
would only be permissible when consistent with an offender’s
deserved punishment.146 As the comments to Section 1.02(2)
make clear, “an appeal to utilitarian goals [such as incapacitation]
should not support a penalty that is too lenient as a matter of
justice to reflect the gravity of the offense, the harm to the victim,
and the blameworthiness of the offender.”147 While scholars have
identified and sought to address the potential conflict between
compassionate release and retributive values,148 additional
theoretical development in this area would be useful to resolve the
tension between Section 305.7, limiting retributivism, and the
provision’s label as a compassionate release measure.149
Finally, the consistent criteria of traditional compassionate
release statutes and their justifications may impede the extension
of sentence modification to populations that have historically been
ineligible for relief.150 Consider, for instance, a prisoner seeking
sentence modification on grounds of serious mental illness.151
144. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text. It is possible that this perceived
conflict accounts for the infrequency of releases under compassionate release statutes. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note 95, at 59–
61 (examining the role of retribution in the Bureau of Prisons’ compassionate release
decisions).
146. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7); TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(i)
(directing that the sentences of individual offenders must occur “within a range of
severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders”).
147. TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. a.
148. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 100, at 876; Frase, supra note 10, at 196, 198.
Particularly enlightening on this score are examinations of the coherence of mercy with
justice. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 108, at 196, 198; Jacob Adler, Murphy and Mercy, 50(4)
ANALYSIS 262, 264--68 (1990); Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182, 182–85, 191–92
(1976); David Dolinko, Some Naïve Thoughts About Justice and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
349, 353–54, 359 (2007); Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 108; Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and
Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162 (1988);
Alwynne Smart, Mercy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 212–27 (H.B. Acton ed.,
1968).
149. See infra notes 210–15 and accompanying text (exploring retributive rationales
for sentence modification).
150. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
151. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (“Only a minority of compassionaterelease laws embrace serious mental infirmities, but the revised Code recommends that
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Section 305.7 expressly includes “mental infirmity” as a basis for
sentence modification.152 Although this term suggests age-related
mental decline, the comments to the provision appear to equate
“mental infirmity” with mental illness.153 These comments stress
the lack of effective treatment for mental illnesses in prisons and
the fact that prison conditions may exacerbate inmates’ disorders,
leaving them unable to cope within the prison environment.154
Efforts to extend relief to mentally ill prisoners may falter,
however, on the recognition that mental disorders often do not
correlate with decreased violence or recidivism.155 If the extension

this should become the universal practice.”); id. at rep. n.b(3) (listing state statutes
including mental infirmity as a ground for compassionate release).
152. See id. § 305.7(1), (7); see also id. cmt. b.
153. See id. cmt. h (“Section 305.7 is designed to respond to circumstances that arise
or are discovered after the time of sentencing, including cases in which the full effects of
known conditions, such as a prisoner’s physical or mental illness, are not appreciated until
a later date.”); id. cmt. b (“While estimates vary, it is clear that a substantial percentage of
inmates in the nation’s prisons suffer from mental illnesses. Often, effective treatment is
unavailable in prison, conditions of the institution may exacerbate the inmate’s condition,
and the inmate’s impairment may make it impossible to navigate the daily life of the
penitentiary.”). Of course, even if “mental infirmity” were confined to age-related mental
degeneration, mental illness could be a “compelling reason” so long as its presence
implicates the purposes of sentencing.
154. See id. cmt. b.
155. The weight of the evidence suggests that mental disorder and clinical symptoms
typically play a negligible role, if any, in recidivism. See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental
Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 564–66, 568 & nn.276–79 (2012) (discussing metaanalyses and other studies); see also Donna L. Hall et al., Predictors of General and Violent
Recidivism Among SMI Prisoners Returning to Communities in New York State, 40 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 221, 229–30 (2012) (“An individual’s psychiatric history, in contrast, did
not add to the prediction of re-arrest. Diagnoses, level of mental health need before
release from prison, or history of psychiatric hospitalization did not differentiate those rearrested.”); Johnston, supra, at 573–74 (“Consistent with research showing that mental
illness is not a dynamic risk factor for reoffending, evidence shows that the provision of
mental health treatment alone is not an effective strategy for reducing the recidivism of
offenders with mental illnesses.”); Arthur J. Lurigio, Examining Prevailing Beliefs about
People with Serious Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, 75 FED. PROBATION 11, 15
(2011) (“[N]o pathogenesis between mental illness and crime has ever been established.
The untreated symptoms of the three most serious mental illnesses (schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, and major depression) suggest either no or a weak casual pathway.”);
Jason Matejkowski, Exploring The Moderating Effects of Mental Illness on Parole Release
Decisions, 75 FED. PROBATION 19, 19 (2011) (“Mental illness is not one of the central eight
risk factors and, in itself, has been found to have little relation to long-term criminal
recidivism.”); Jillian Peterson et al., Analyzing Offense Patterns as a Function of Mental Illness
to Test the Criminalization Hypothesis, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1217 (2010). In addition,
compassionate release may be deemed inappropriate given the cyclic and episodic nature
of mental illness and the potential difficulty in predicting the course of an inmate’s
illness. See Aldenberg, supra note 59, at 553 (noting the difficulty of predicting the course
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of Section 305.7 to individuals with mental illnesses will be
difficult, its application to individuals without any physical or
mental infirmity—such as those offenders whose sentences are
arguably excessive given their rehabilitation, their heroic acts, or
society’s changed perceptions of the gravity of their offenses—will
be even more unlikely.156 These populations are not associated
with any inherent loss of recidivist potential or costly medical
services, so their release could (in practical terms) pose a threat to
public safety and is unlikely to yield the robust cost savings
promised by the release of elderly or seriously ill inmates.157 Unless
sentencing commissions, judges, legislators, or commentators
construct persuasive, alternative rationales—beyond those
inherent in the traditional compassionate release narrative—as to
why early release is appropriate, justified, and perhaps necessary
for these populations, states may be inclined to exclude them
from relief, and judges (particularly those who are elected) may
exercise their discretion to release only certain categories of
offenders.158
IV. THE ANALOGY OF JUDICIAL SENTENCE MODIFICATION
Instead of framing Section 305.7 as a compassionate
release measure, the American Legal Institute could have turned
to another legal analog: the historical model of judicial sentence
modification.159 Though current rules vary,160 many states have
of an inmate’s illness, the fact that an inmate can recover, and the consequent threat he
may pose to public).
156. See Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 495–97.
157. See id. at 493–95 (discussing the high cost of providing care for mentally ill
inmates and the potential savings that would come with early release of such inmates as
compared to those who are healthier).
158. See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 1–3 (discussing the history of judicial
sentence modification in Maryland); Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 529
(discussing the broad discretion that judges are afforded in sentence modification).
159. Interestingly, commentary within and outside of the revised Model Penal Code
has noted that the “second look” provision of Section 305.6 bears some similarity to the
judicial sentence-reconsideration power that exists in many states. See TD-2, supra note 10,
§ 305.6 cmt. d (taking note of states’ judicial sentence modification provisions but
concluding that Section 305.6 bears “little similarity” to these measures because most
statutes only allow judges several months to modify offenders’ sentences and none—like
Section 305.6—imposes a long delay before the court’s authority materializes); id. rep.
n.d; see also Love & Klingele, supra note 16, at 875 (“[W]hile it is true that no jurisdiction
specifically directs judges to review lengthy sentences after a proscribed period of years, a
handful of jurisdictions do permit judicial sentence modification years after a sentence
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adopted judicial sentence modification rules similar to the former
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).161 The federal rule, in
force until 1987, provided that a trial judge could reduce a
sentence for any reason within 120 days of its imposition, either
sua sponte or on motion of defense counsel.162 The motion was
“essentially a plea for leniency”163 and “afford[ed] the judge an
opportunity to reconsider the sentence in the light of any further
information about the defendant or the case which may have been
presented to him in the interim.”164 Section 305.7 resembles the
historical exercise of judicial sentence modification: the provision
vests judges with broad discretion—unconstrained by correctional
agencies or parole boards—to modify an inmate’s sentence when
it is unjust or inappropriate, or to otherwise effectuate authorized
purposes of punishment.165 Though states’ substantive criteria vary

has been imposed. Such modifications are often granted in cases where the circumstances
surrounding a prisoner’s incarceration have changed in ways that would be captured by
the standard for modification set forth in Section 305.6—that is, when ‘in light of present
circumstances . . . the purposes of sentencing . . . would better be served by a modified
sentence than the prisoner’s completion of the original sentence.’”) (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE § 305.6(4)). Arguably, the broadest state judicial sentence modification
statutes more closely resemble Section 305.7 than Section 305.6, since Section 305.7 does
not delay courts’ sentence modification power. Professor Cecelia Klingele, the Associate
Reporter of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing project, wrote one of the most important
articles on judicial sentence modification. See Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9.
160. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.6 rep. n.f; Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at
10–14 (reviewing state and federal law regarding judicial sentence modification);
Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 498–512. Some states do not give trial
judges the statutory power to reduce legal sentences. See Grossman & Shapiro supra, at 11
n.76.
161. See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 13 (stating that the rules in a majority
of states resemble the former federal rule and that many states’ rules were patterned after
it); Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 500–01.
162. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
163. Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
164. United States v. Ellenbogan, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1968).
165. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7) & cmt. a. It is possible, however, that the
criterion “compelling” in Section 305.7 will narrow judges’ discretion to modify
sentences, as compared to the broad “upon reflection” standard applicable to judicial
reconsideration in some states. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney for the N. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 172
N.E.2d 245, 250 (Mass. 1961). The comments to Section 305.7 provide little guidance on
what meaning should attach to the term “compelling.” See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7
cmt. a (“The provision is intended to respond to circumstances that arise or are
discovered after the time of sentencing, when those circumstances give compelling reason
to reevaluate the original sentence.”); id. cmt. b (noting the similarity between “the openended ‘compelling reasons’ standard” in Section 305.7 and the “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” standard in federal law, as well as two state standards: “the catch-all
standard of ‘good cause shown,’” and “whether the prisoner is ‘a suitable candidate for
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somewhat,166 the most glaring difference between Section 305.7
and states’ current judicial sentence modification rules lies in
timing: states only allow judges a narrow window to modify legal
sentences (often between sixty days and one year),167 but Section
305.7 authorizes modification at any point during the course of an
inmate’s imprisonment.168
Because states have used judicial sentence modification to
recognize a number of sentencing interests,169 framing Section
305.7 as an extension of states’ judicial sentence modification
practices would facilitate the expression of the many utilitarian
and nonutilitarian sentencing purposes underlying Sections 305.7
and 1.02(2).170 For instance, some states rely upon sentence
suspension of sentence,’ without elaboration of what counts toward suitability”). It is clear
that a “compelling” reason must, at a minimum, call into question the justness or
appropriateness of the original sentence, in light of applicable sentencing purposes listed
in Section 1.02(2). See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7) & cmt. a. It is also clear that a
compelling reason need not be extraordinary, see supra note 29, and that drafters
intended to restrict “compelling” reasons to those that arise, are discovered, or are only
fully appreciated postsentencing, see TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7, cmts. a & h. But see supra
note 49 (observing that this limitation does not occur within the text of Section 305.7).
The experience of sentence modification in Wisconsin, where courts may modify
sentences upon a finding of a “new factor,” may be instructive in this regard. See Rosado v.
State, 234 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Wis. 1975) (defining a “new factor” for purposes of judicial
sentence modification). For a discussion of Wisconsin’s common law judicial sentence
modification power and the new factor test, see Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note
9, at 506–09; Katherine R. Kruse & Kim E. Patterson, Comment, Wisconsin Sentence
Modification: A View from the Trial Court, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 441, 445–50 (1989) (outlining
the development of the new factor test); Jesse J. Norris, Should States Expand Judicial
Sentence Modification? A Cautionary Tale, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 109–15, 123–24 (2012).
166. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.6 rep. n.f (observing that “[m]ost sentencemodification provisions do not articulate a theoretical model or substantive criteria for
granting a sentence reduction” and listing exceptions that permit modification, for
instance, to advance “interests of justice” or in light of “exceptional rehabilitation of the
offender”).
167. See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 11 & nn.78–81.
168. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. a. In this respect, Section 305.7 somewhat
resembles the former Maryland rule, which authorized judges to “reduce a sentence at
any time for any reason, as long as the defendant ha[d] filed a motion to modify the
sentence within ninety days,” Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 1, a requirement that
defense attorneys regularly satisfied, id. at 45.
169. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.6 rep. n.f; Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at
39–42 (reporting that judges consider a combination of objectives in sentencing and may
use sentence modification to further multiple goals of punishment).
170. See Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 519 (“By inviting the
sentencing court to revisit the original sentencing decision in light of post-sentencing
realities, judicial sentence modification provides the sentencing court with the
opportunity to reassess, in light of more accurate information, whether the original
sentencing decision was just and whether it entailed a prudent allocation of costly
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modification as a means to advance the interests of justice.171 In
the words of the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
Occasions inevitably will occur where a
conscientious judge, after reflection or upon receipt
of new probation reports or other information, will
feel that he has been too harsh or has failed to give
weight to mitigating factors which properly he
should have taken into account. In such cases the
interests of justice and sound judicial administration
will be served by permitting the trial judge to
reduce the sentence within a reasonable time.172
Section 305.7 would also authorize a judge to modify an offender’s
sentence to prevent disproportionate punishment.173

correctional resources.”); Norris, supra note 165, at 103–04 (“Well-crafted judicial
sentence modification doctrines may serve to (1) enhance justice by responding to
information showing that the full sentence is not necessary or deserved; (2) foster
rehabilitation and successful reentry into society by taking into account the progress and
circumstances of the defendant; and (3) generate costs savings without endangering
public safety.”).
171. See, e.g., TENN. R. CRIM P. 35 Advisory Commission Cmt. (“The intent of this rule
is to allow modification only in circumstances where an alteration of the sentence may be
proper in the interests of justice.”); State v. Franklin, 434 N.W.2d 609, 611–12, 614 (Wis.
1989) (identifying “the correction of unjust sentences” as the purpose of sentence
modification); Hayes v. State, 175 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Wis. 1970) (“Within reasonable limits
we think an unjust sentence should be corrected by the trial court. It is more important to
be able to settle a matter right with a little uncertainty than to settle it wrong
irrevocably.”); see also Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 39–40 (indicating that
Maryland judges may use sentence modification to reflect the determination that “the
defendant [has] been punished enough”). Recognizing the importance of judicial
sentence modification for correcting injustice, commentators and the American Bar
Association have advocated for an expansion of judicial sentence modification power. See
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING § 18-7.1 & Commentary (3d ed.
1994) (advocating that trial courts have the opportunity “to reduce the severity of any
sentence” for “a specified period after imposition of a sentence” in order to advance the
“interests of justice” by allowing the court to “rectify those judgments that it realizes were
excessive” and to respond “to new factual information . . . that alters materially the
information base on which sentence was imposed.”).
172. Dist. Attorney for the N. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 172 N.E.2d 245, 250–51 (Mass. 1961).
173. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b; Frase, supra note 10, at 196 (observing
that “advanced age or serious infirmity would justify early release if, [under proposed
Model Penal Code § 305.7],” those conditions made “incarceration . . . much more
onerous for such an offender, making continued custody disproportionate or even
cruel”); Klingele, supra note 45, at 455 (suggesting that early release “should remain an
option for correcting injustices that come to light after the sentence has commenced” and
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Framing Section 305.7 as an extension of states’ judicial
sentence modification laws would also facilitate conversations
about how sentence modification could advance utilitarian goals
other than incapacitation.174 The experience of sentence
modification in Maryland may be instructive in this regard. Like
Section 305.7, Maryland’s former judicial sentence modification
rule was quite broad175: it authorized judges to “reduce a sentence
at any time for any reason, as long as the defendant has filed a
motion to modify the sentence within ninety days.”176 In a 2003
survey, Maryland judges, consistent with authorized aims of
punishment,177 indicated that a primary goal of modifying
sentences more than ninety days after imposition was to advance
the goal of rehabilitation.178 In particular, judges often sought to
ensure “that the defendant would make significant progress or
complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program.”179 Other
goals mentioned by a significant number of judges included
“seeing whether the defendant would stay out of trouble in one
manner or another,” “seeing whether the defendant would
complete or make significant progress in an educational
program,” “determining whether the defendant had been
rehabilitated,” and “seeing whether the defendant exhibited
exemplary conduct while incarcerated.”180 The authors of the
endorsing the draft Model Penal Code provision 305.7 as a means to accomplish that
purpose).
174. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (“The purposes of sentencing that
originally supported a sentence of imprisonment may in some instances become
inapplicable to a prisoner who reaches an advanced age while incarcerated, or a prisoner
whose physical or mental conditions renders it unnecessary [or] counterproductive . . . to
continue a term of confinement.”); Frase, supra note 10, at 197–98 (identifying and
critiquing a number of grounds potentially justifying sentence modification under Section
305.7).
175. See MD. CT. R. 4-345. Indeed, Maryland’s judicial sentence modification rule
bears a striking resemblance to Section 305.7 and may have inspired its creation. See
Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 515, 536 (endorsing and urging the
expansion of judicial sentence modification procedures like those in Maryland).
176. Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 1. Defense attorneys filed sentence
modification motions as a matter of course. See id. at 45. Maryland amended its rule in
2005 to provide that a court “may not revise [a] sentence after the expiration of five years
from the date the sentence originally was imposed on the defendant.” Klingele, Changing
the Sentence, supra note 9, at 503 (quoting MD. CT. R. 4-345(e)(1)).
177. Rehabilitation was an authorized aim of punishment in Maryland. See Grossman
& Shapiro, supra note 27, at 26.
178. See id. at 39.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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study, Professors Steven Grossman and Stephen Shapiro, opined
that sentence modification is valuable because the utilitarian goals
of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence “may arguably be
implemented better at a time beyond the original imposition of
sentence.”181 The professors highlighted relevant sentencing issues
that may benefit from post-sentencing assessment in this way:
How rapidly has the offender’s alcohol, drug
or psychological counseling progressed in making
him less subject to the influences that were at the
root of his criminal conduct? Has he or she made
restitution, completed community service or
fulfilled other obligations imposed by the judge for
the betterment of the victim or the offender? Does
the offender still pose such a danger to the
community that he needs to be separated from it?
Has the offender been punished enough so that he
will regard the consequences of being apprehended
and punished for criminal conduct as outweighing
the benefits of such conduct? Many judges and
other proponents of sentence revision believe that
all of these questions are best answered after
observing the defendant for some time after his
sentence has begun and that the judge is best
positioned to evaluate them.182
Similarly, Section 305.7 authorizes judges to reduce a sentence, at
any time when its severity exceeds that which is necessary to
achieve applicable utilitarian aims, so long as the sentence
remains within the boundaries of proportionate punishment.183
Critically, framing Section 305.7 as modeled on states’
judicial sentence modification rules would allow the public to
focus on the dictates of parsimonious, proportionate punishment
and avoid unnecessary distractions imposed by the constraining

181. Id. at 34.
182. Id. at 34–35.
183. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7(7) & cmt. a (discussing the importance of
evaluating sentence modification in light of the principles of limiting retributivism); TD-1,
supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(iii) & cmt. f (reflecting and explaining the principle of
parsimony).
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label of compassionate release.184 Such framing would not remove
factors from consideration, but would rather diffuse their
seemingly dispositive status. Instead of focusing narrowly on
incapacitation and the cost savings that could be realized by
releasing certain populations of prisoners, states would be
prompted to consider a variety of utilitarian aims, as well as the
requirements of desert.185 States could thus avoid awkward
attempts to justify the striking differences between laws modeled
on Section 305.7 and traditional compassionate release measures,
such as the omission of an incapacity requirement.186 A general
focus on correcting excessive, unwise, and unjust sentences would
also facilitate the application of the provision to populations
beyond those with permanently debilitating medical conditions or
terminal illnesses, and would allow offenders who have committed
serious crimes to benefit from the measure.187 In sum, the
template of judicial sentence modification would be flexible
enough to allow states to focus on the principle of parsimony and
the goal that sentences be no more severe than necessary to
achieve utilitarian aims within the range of proportionate
punishment.188
To be sure, conceptualizing Section 305.7 in this way would
not entail neglecting the effect of advanced age or illness in
sentencing. Deriving Section 305.7 expressly from Rule 35(b) and
its state analogs would naturally lead to discussions, rooted in
principles of limiting retributivism, about how excessive
punishment may result from advanced age and illness.189 As
previously mentioned, state judicial sentence modification
provisions typically allow broad discretion to modify sentences
within sixty days to one year of a sentence’s imposition.190 To
184. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmts. a & b.
185. See id. § 305.7(7); TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)–(b).
186. See, e.g., TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7, cmts. b–c (explicating differences between
Section 305.7 and existing compassionate release statutes); supra Part III.A.
187. See Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 504 (discussing the
reconsideration of sentences by Maryland judges for “a wide range of reasons”).
188. See TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(iii); id. cmt. f (“Once utilitarian goals and
considerations of proportionality have been consulted in individual cases, the penalties
imposed should be sufficient but not excessive to serve those objectives.”).
189. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 10, at 196 (“Incarceration is much more onerous for
[offenders of advanced age and serious infirmity], making continued custody
disproportionate or even cruel.”).
190. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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justify the omission of this temporal limitation, comments could
consider how unjustness or excessiveness may manifest late in an
offender’s sentence.191 States’ compassionate release statutes
would be useful to illustrate these concerns, as would judicial
sentence modification efforts in those states without a narrow
temporal range.192 However, framing Section 305.7 as a general,
undifferentiated measure to address excessive, unjust, and
inappropriate sentences would permit a broader discussion of the
interests of elderly and ill prisoners (as well as other offenders)
and the harms they may experience when incarcerated than is
possible, or at least likely, when the conversation starts from the
narrow and cramped perspective of existing compassionate release
measures.
V. CONCLUSION AND SCHOLARLY AGENDA
While the American Legal Institute could have chosen to
frame Section 305.7 within the historical tradition of judicial
sentence modification, it did not. Perhaps drafters rejected the
analogy because they anticipated that Section 305.7’s requirement
that reasons underlying sentence modification be “compelling”
would restrict judges’ discretion in ways materially different from
the broad discretion that they enjoy under sentence
reconsideration laws.193 Or perhaps they wanted to reserve the
legal analog as the express precursor for other provisions of the

191. In addition to infirmity from age or illness, other factors may also contribute to
excessive punishment, such as the failure of an anticipated correctional program to
materialize. See Kruse & Patterson, supra note 165, at 451–53 (discussing the recognition
of this factor in Wisconsin).
192. At least to some extent, judges have modified sentences on grounds of advanced
age and serious illness. See, e.g., Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 40 (listing sentence
modification criteria used in Maryland); Kruse & Patterson, supra note 165, at 457–58
(reporting a limited number of successful sentence modification motions in Wisconsin on
grounds of defendants’ declining health and explaining the relevance of a defendant’s
health to resentencing in this way: “If an illness is sufficiently life-threatening, the court's
original sentence may have increased in severity and become a ‘life’ sentence. If a
defendant’s health problem is so debilitating that the defendant will be physically unable
to commit further crimes, the defendant’s health would be relevant to the need to protect
society against him or her.”). But see Norris, supra note 165, at 111–12 (explaining that,
while Wisconsin courts have viewed an untreatable psychological condition as a new
factor, courts have held that a defendant’s declining health and diminished life
expectancy may not support sentence modification under a new factor theory).
193. See supra note 166.
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revised Model Penal Code.194 Alternatively, they may simply have
wanted to avoid the controversy that has surrounded the existence
of the few judicial sentence modification statutes with no
durational limits.195 For whatever reason, the American Legal
Institute chose to align the provision with more popular
compassionate release efforts.196 Where does this reality leave us?
Because the traditional label of compassionate release does
not allow for the full range of possibilities available under—and
expressly contemplated by—Section 305.7, we must expand the
popular but narrow conception of “compassionate release” and
provide persuasive, theoretically sound accounts of when the
purposes of punishment and ancillary administrative
considerations justify the early release of prisoners.197 Cogent
rationales will be particularly critical both to protect the sentence
modification measure from rollback after some beneficiaries
commit crimes after release, and to extend sentence modification,
in practice, beyond the grounds recognized by most
compassionate release laws.198 A first step in this effort will involve
194. See supra note 161; TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.6 cmt. f (“The second-look
provision is not meant to displace rules concerning sentence reconsideration authorized
during the early stages of a prison sentence. The sentencing judge’s front-end
reconsideration powers should perhaps be expanded beyond existing rules, but this is a
separate subject to be taken up in an as-yet- undrafted provision of the revised Code.”).
195. See, e.g., Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 9, at 504.
196. See supra Part III.B (exploring possible rationales for affixing the label of
compassionate release to Section 305.7).
197. See Frase, supra note 10, at 197–98 (listing types of circumstances that could
support sentence modification under the anticipated “extraordinary and compelling”
catchall of Section 305.7). For one approach, which emphasizes data-driven rehabilitative
potential and cost savings, see Fan, supra note 16, at 633, 637–39 (proposing
“rehabilitative pragmatism” as a “successor penal theory”).
198. Numerous commentators have remarked upon the backlash that can occur, and
has occurred, when an inmate who has been released early commits a crime. See, e.g.,
Beck, supra note 73, at 227 (“Society’s compassion for dying inmates will immediately be
eliminated if any individual granted a reduction in his/her sentence commits a crime
once released.”); Fan, supra note 16, at 597 (“If even one released offender ‘goes berserk’
and commits a horrific crime, political careers will end and policy will swing sharply back,
perhaps to an even more severe state.”); id. at 626–33 (exploring the risk of backlash
against decision-makers and early release programs when the public perceives programs
as jeopardizing public safety and listing examples of crimes by beneficiaries of early
programs); Klingele, supra note 45, at 432–35 (describing the elimination of early release
programs in New Jersey and Illinois after crimes were committed by beneficiaries of early
release programs). The fragility and infrequent use of current compassionate release laws
suggests that they could benefit from increased theoretical attention. See, e.g., CHIU, supra
note 9, at 6–7 (discussing the low use of geriatric release mechanisms in states);
Murphy, supra note 69, at 1696–97 (detailing jurisdictions’ varying use of compassionate
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identifying circumstances likely to affect the applicability of the
utilitarian aims
recognized in
Section
1.02(2)(a)(ii):
rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous
offenders, restoration of crime victims and communities, and
reintegration of offenders in the law-abiding community.199 States’
judicial sentence modification efforts may be instructive in this
regard.200 Scholars should then provide detailed accounts of how
and why these circumstances should factor into the calculation of
appropriate punishment under the theory of limiting
retributivism.201
Efforts should not stop there, however. To the extent that
cost and resource considerations remain as practical drivers for
the early release of prisoners, investigation is also necessary into
how the concerns affecting the administration of the sentencing
system, listed under Section 1.02(2)(b), should factor into
individual sentencing decisions. Specifically, commentary would
be useful on whether, and how, to weigh systemic considerations
against the purposes of sentencing listed within Section 1.02(2)(a)
in crafting individual sentences.202 It is notable that Section
1.02(2)(a)(iii) directs that sentences should be “no more severe
than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes in subsections
(a)(i) and (a)(ii),” but resource considerations are not found
within those provisions.203 Rather, the revised Model Penal Code
denotes resource considerations—namely, ensuring “that
adequate resources are available for carrying out sentences
imposed and that rational priorities are established for the use of
those resources”—as “matters affecting the administration of the

release programs and concluding that “[o]ften, inmates and taxpayers alike rarely reap
the benefits of the legislation,” but identifying two states—Texas and Michigan—that have
released over 100 inmates per year).
199. See Frase, supra note 10, at 196–98.
200. Obtaining information on the practice of judicial sentence modification can be
difficult. See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 45 (remarking upon the difficulty of
obtaining an accurate picture of the use of sentence reduction “due to inadequate record
keeping at the county level” and urging judges to transmit, and counties to maintain, a
record of each use of the sentence modification power); Klingele, Changing the Sentence,
supra note 9, at 502, 508.
201. See supra note 138 (illustrating how judges should sentence under a limiting
retributivist framework).
202. See TD-1, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. g (discussing the identification and
operation of systemic purposes).
203. See id. § 1.02(2)(a).
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sentencing system” in Section 1.02(2)(b).204 This language and
structure appear to signal that systemic resource considerations
should not play a role in individual sentencing decisions.
However, Comment g to Section 1.02(2) suggests that sentencing
courts should remain sensitive to the systemic considerations listed
in Section 1.02(2)(b).205 No definitive guidance is provided on
how judges might factor resource scarcity considerations into the
sentencing or resentencing of individual offenders.206
Finally, since sentences under Sections 305.7 and 1.02(2)
must occur within the range of deserved and proportionate
punishment, institutional actors and commentators should
consider when an offender’s changed circumstances affect
retributive concerns or utilitarian principles of proportionality.
Mental illness and infirmity, for instance, may implicate a number
of concerns along these dimensions. First, an individual’s mental
infirmity may render him incapable of understanding why he is
being punished.207 When a prisoner lacks a rational understanding
of punishment, he may no longer be a fit subject for retributive
punishment.208 Second, prisons may be ill-equipped to provide
204. Id. § 1.02(2)(b).
205. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. g (“While § 1.02(2)(a) speaks to the purposes of the
sentencing system as applied in individual case decisions, § 1.02(2)(b) addresses purposes
applicable to the administration of the system as a whole. The systemic purposes are
matters of potential concern to every governmental actor within the system, and not solely
to persons with policymaking authority.”); id. (providing an example of a sentencing
court’s honoring the goal of uniformity while sentencing an individual offender).
206. See id. § 1.02(2) cmt. g (noting that a sentencing commission should “ensure
that sentencing policies make the best use of available or funded correctional resources,”
but failing to articulate whether or how judges might factor such considerations into the
sentencing or resentencing of individual offenders). Professor Frase has argued that
judges should consider sanctions’ costs and adverse collateral consequences—both for the
offender, and for society—when imposing sentences. See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST
SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 33 (2013) (arguing
that the “ends-benefits proportionality principle” should apply “at both the systemic and
individual-case levels: Judges should . . . consider these matters when imposing sentence,
and should strive to be sure that the benefits of the sentence are not outweighed by its
negative effects. . . . [S]anctions have substantial costs, burdens, and undesirable collateral
consequences for the offender and others, and all of those consequences—not just the
expected benefits—must be taken into account”); cf. Frase, supra note 138, at 73 (arguing
that utilitarian theory requires recognition that, “[i]n a world of limited resources,
punishment must also be prioritized[; p]rison beds and other scarce correctional
resources should be reserved for the most socially harmful offenses and offenders[; and
p]risons must also not be used beyond their effective capacities”).
207. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 372 (1981).
208. See id.; id. at 384–85 (“[C]onsider someone who knowingly and willfully
committed a wrong but who since has become insane or has suffered brain damage and so
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adequately for the complex needs of very ill inmates, and an
inmate’s continued confinement in unsuitable and injurious
conditions may be inhumane and therefore violate retributivism’s
prohibition against degrading or dehumanizing punishments.209
Notably, the commentary to Section 305.7 suggests that inhumane
conditions of confinement would justify sentence modification,210
and commentators have mentioned inhumanity as a possible
ground for compassionate release.211 Third, the harshness of a
seriously ill inmate’s prison experience may factor into the
proportionality of his sentence under retributive or utilitarian

would be incapable of understanding, if punished, what was being done to him and why. .
. . He should not have the penalty visited upon him because he is incapable of being the
(knowing) recipient of retributive punishment, and so incapable of being connected (at
least by the act of punishment) to correct values qua correct values.”); see also R.A. DUFF,
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 27 (1986); Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The
Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 933 (2010); Dan
Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 1163, 1218 (2009). At least two sets of commentators have referenced the
importance of inmates’ competency to be punished for compassionate release laws. See
Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 108, at 1466; Williams et al., supra note 67, at 122 (“[The
traditional justifications for punishment of retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and
incapacitation] may be substantially undermined for prisoners who are too ill or
cognitively impaired to be aware of punishment, too sick to participate in rehabilitation,
or too functionally compromised to pose a risk to public safety.”).
209. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 233 (1979)
(decrying “a punishment which is in itself degrading, which treats the prisoner as an
animal instead of a human being, which perhaps even is an attempt to reduce him to an
animal or a mere thing” as inconsistent with human dignity); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1054 (1978) (“Because the value underlying modern retributivism is to
treat people with the concern and respect due persons, a punishment that violated our
current conception of human dignity could not be justified on retributivist grounds.”).
210. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (“The purposes of sentencing that
originally supported a sentence of imprisonment may in some instances become
inapplicable to . . . a prisoner whose mental or physical condition renders it . . . inhumane
to continue a term of confinement.”).
211. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 113, at 87 (arguing that elderly
prisoners’ human rights may be violated by poor conditions of confinement, including
inadequate access to medical treatment); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note 95, at 75–76 (“To be consistent with human rights, a
decision regarding whether a prisoner should remain confined despite, for example,
terminal illness or serious incapacitation, should include careful consideration of whether
continued imprisonment would be inhumane, degrading, or otherwise inconsistent with
human dignity.”); Frase, supra note 10, at 196 (observing that “advanced age or serious
infirmity would justify early release if [under proposed Section 305.7] . . . those conditions
made ‘incarceration . . . much more onerous for such an offender, making continued
custody disproportionate or even cruel’”).
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conceptions of proportionality.212 Vulnerability to harm could
factor into retributive assessments of punishment severity through
the theory of equal impact articulated by Professors Andrew
Ashworth, Andrew von Hirsch, and others.213 Alternatively, the
past and likely future suffering of the offender may affect the
ends-benefits proportionality of a sentence, a utilitarian principle
of proportionality explicated by Professor Richard Frase.214 Future
212. See TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.7 cmt. b (observing that “[o]ften . . . effective
treatment is unavailable in prison [for inmates with mental illness], conditions of the
institution may exacerbate the inmate’s condition, and the inmate’s impairment may
make it impossible to navigate the daily life of the penitentiary” and urging the inclusion
of mental infirmity in sentence modification statutes as “the universal practice” on this
basis). But see TD-2, supra note 10, § 305.6 cmt. f (failing to include disproportionality in
sentence severity due to increased vulnerability to harm as supporting sentence
modification on proportionality grounds under Section 305.6). For a careful
differentiation of various retributive and utilitarian principles of proportionality, see
Frase, supra note 41, at 132–41; Frase, supra note 130, at 40–47.
213. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 172 (2005) (explaining that the theory of equal impact holds
that, “when an offender suffers from certain handicaps that would make his punishment
significantly more onerous, the sanction should be adjusted in order to avoid its having an
undue differential impact on him”); Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal
Treatment and the Impact of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 251, 252–
61 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998) (discussing the principle of equal
impact in sentencing); E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing
and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 194 n.219, 221–28 (2013)
(discussing the equal impact theory and applying it to offenders with serious mental
illnesses); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 182, 199–210 (2009) (arguing that various versions of retributivism must factor
subjective experience into sentencing in order to fulfill the proportionality requirement).
Professor Berry has observed that the principle of equal impact could theoretically
support the compassionate release of certain prisoners but, with little analysis, concluded
that this principle “is rarely applicable” in situations involving terminal illnesses or
permanent physical or medical conditions. Berry, supra note 100, at 875–76; cf. MOORE,
supra note 108, at 173 (arguing that “when the particular circumstances of the offender
[such as advanced age or illness] make the usual punishment undeservedly severe,
retributive justice calls for clemency”); Frase, supra note 10, at 196 (observing that
“advanced age or serious infirmity would justify early release if [under proposed Section
305.7] . . . those conditions made “incarceration . . . much more onerous for such an
offender, making continued custody disproportionate”).
214. Professor Richard Frase has explored the concepts of utilitarian proportionality,
including ends-benefits and alternative-means proportionality, in his theoretical writings.
See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN
LAW (2009); Frase, supra note 41, at 139–41; Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences,
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 571, 592–97 (2005); Frase, supra note 130, at 43--47. Under ends-benefits
proportionality, “[a] penalty may be disproportionality severe because its costs and
burdens outweigh the likely benefits produced by the penalty.” Frase, supra note 41, at
138. This proportionality equation should include the costs and burdens that a sanction
poses to an offender—including his likely suffering—and to society. See Frase, supra note
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work will explore these alternatives in more depth.215 Building the
theoretical case for sentence modification in these circumstances
would evidence “compassion for human suffering,”216 contribute
to a more humane and just punishment experience, and allow
Model Penal Code § 305.7 to achieve its lofty potential.

214, at 593–94. Professor Frase has observed that Minnesota courts have recognized the
ends-benefits proportionality principle in authorizing downward sentencing departures
on the basis of anticipated vulnerability to victimization or other harm in prison. See Frase,
supra note 41, at 146.
215. See E. Lea Johnston, Modifying Unjust Sentences (draft on file with author).
216. See Rapaport, supra note 74, at 17 (“The good reason to show unearned mercy is
compassion for human suffering. The aged or other inflicted prisoner may not have
reformed, rehabilitated or otherwise earned consideration for relief. His or her claim to
consideration may reside solely in need and suffering.”).

